From Chen Zhi to Yu Zhijiang: The Dark End of Southeast Asia's Cyber Fraud Empire

From November 2025 to January 2026, a series of shocking scenes in the cross-border telecom fraud industry unfolded one after another. The main culprit of Myanmar’s Myawaddy “Asia-Pacific New City,” Yu Zhijiang, was extradited from Thailand back to China; the founder of the Prince Group in Cambodia, Chen Zhi, was arrested and repatriated in Cambodia—these two cases marked the complete destruction of the three major Southeast Asian telecom fraud gangs and revealed the true face of the cross-border black industry empire.

Seemingly similar outcomes, but behind them are two completely different criminal paths. Chen Zhi chose to deeply integrate into Cambodia’s legitimate economic system, building a “corporate group + crypto money laundering” black empire; while Yu Zhijiang rooted himself in the turbulent separatist chaos of Myanmar, colluding with warlords to establish a criminal hotbed of “telecom fraud parks + industry subcontracting.” The rise and fall of these two individuals are essentially a “black mirror” of the unique national conditions of Myanmar and Cambodia, providing profound insights for global governance of cross-border crime.

Two Different Paths of Criminal Expansion

Chen Zhi’s “Red-Top Laundering” Empire

Born in 1987, Chen Zhi represents a new type of black industry leader in the cryptocurrency era. Unlike traditional telecom fraud bosses who hide in the shadows, he stepped into the spotlight, carefully packaging his criminal empire.

Since 2015, Chen Zhi registered seemingly legitimate companies in over 30 countries—real estate developers, financial institutions, travel agencies, tech R&D firms—each “shell” company providing perfect cover for his actual scam network. This “compliance exterior + global scam” model thrived in Cambodia. In July 2020, then-Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen personally awarded Chen Zhi an honorary title, which fully whitewashed the Prince Group, making him a veritable “red-top businessman.”

Chen Zhi’s true genius lay in finding cryptocurrency as the “perfect money laundering tool.” He established LuBian mining pools, funneling the proceeds of telecom fraud into Bitcoin mining, legitimizing the illicit funds under the guise of “mining.” Ironically, he even boasted to core members that mining was “highly profitable because there are no costs”—this “costless” operation was funded entirely by scam proceeds. By the end of 2020, Chen Zhi had accumulated 127,000 Bitcoins, worth over $15 billion, earning him the title of “cryptocurrency black industry tycoon.”

His scam network spans the globe, including a “Brooklyn network” in the United States, which used “high-yield crypto investments” as bait to deceive over 250 victims, totaling more than $18 million. Different countries’ judicial barriers instead became protective barriers for his criminal activities.

Ironically, Chen Zhi’s empire fractured during a “black eats black” incident. In December 2020, the core Bitcoin wallet of LuBian mining pool was hacked, and 127,000 Bitcoins were stolen. Chen Zhi even posted over 1,500 plea messages on the blockchain, willing to pay ransom, but it was too late. After four years of silence, these Bitcoins were transferred to a new address in 2024, eventually tracked and seized by the U.S. Department of Justice on charges of money laundering—setting the largest asset forfeiture record in U.S. judicial history.

In October 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal charges against Chen Zhi; in January 2026, he was arrested and extradited from Cambodia. His meticulously built business empire collapsed under the force of international judicial cooperation.

Yu Zhijiang’s “Warlord Seizure” Empire

Five years older than Chen Zhi, Yu Zhijiang (also known as She Lunkai) took a completely different black industry route. Born in 1982 in Shaodong, Hunan, his life was full of twists: he worked in over 20 professions, and in 2014 was convicted in absentia by the Yantai court in Shandong for illegal lottery operations. To evade crackdown, he obtained Cambodian nationality in 2017, changed his name to She Lunkai, and transformed himself into the “Chairman of Asia-Pacific International Holding Group.”

In 2017, Yu Zhijiang set his sights on Myawaddy in Myanmar, deeply colluding with local Kachin border military leader Su Qi Du. Su Qi Du, known as the “King of Myawaddy,” controlled the Kachin Border Guard Army, a local ethnic armed group incorporated into the Myanmar government, operating outside the central authority—truly a “lawless zone.”

Under Su Qi Du’s protection, Yu Zhijiang launched the “Asia-Pacific New City” project—publicly claiming to invest $15 billion in an 180,000-acre “Smart Industry New City,” but in reality, it was a criminal hotbed combining gambling, scams, and human trafficking, notorious as the “KK Park.”

Unlike Chen Zhi’s “self-operated scams,” Yu Zhijiang’s brilliance was in inventing an “industrialized telecom fraud” model. He did not directly participate in scams but turned Asia-Pacific New City into a standardized telecom fraud park, leasing sites to 248 telecom fraud groups, providing property and security, and collecting “rent” and “protection fees.” This formed a complete industrial chain: from procuring kidnapped persons from Thai human traffickers (costing 300,000-400,000 yuan per person, with 100,000 used to bribe border police), to services like cleaning, supermarkets, restaurants within the park, and finally to scam operators (“bosses”) and low-level “pigs,” creating a “recruitment-transportation-imprisonment-scam-profit-sharing” closed loop.

This dark empire inflicted catastrophic damage on China. Investigations revealed his group operated over 200 gambling platforms, attracting 330,000 participants nationwide, with involved funds reaching 2.7 billion yuan. Even more horrifying, only fewer than 100 of the 50,000 trapped in Myawaddy manage to escape annually—those subjected to militarized management, forced labor, torture, and abuse, with minor offenses met with beatings and severe cases resulting in death.

In 2021, China’s Ministry of Public Security issued a red notice through Interpol; in August 2022, Thai police arrested him in Bangkok; after more than three years of judicial struggle, in November 2025, Yu Zhijiang was successfully extradited back to China and detained by the Zhenjiang Public Security Bureau. His dark empire was obliterated under the iron fist of international judicial cooperation.

Fundamental Contrasts Between the Two Empires: Expansion Logic Divide

Although both Chen Zhi and Yu Zhijiang’s criminal empires are “giants” in the cross-border telecom fraud industry, their expansion logic, profit structures, and ways of downfall are fundamentally different—deeply rooted in the unique national conditions of Myanmar and Cambodia.

Differences in Expansion Logic

Chen Zhi’s approach is “integrated expansion”—by diversifying into compliant businesses (real estate, finance, tourism) and establishing deep ties with the Cambodian government, reinforced by medals and honors, he enhances his “red-top businessman” identity, hiding criminal activities behind legitimate operations. This model is highly covert, leveraging official resources for global expansion, but at the cost of high dependence on local government protection—once this protection is lost or international crackdowns intensify, it collapses rapidly.

Yu Zhijiang’s approach is “separatist expansion”—avoiding direct confrontation with the Myanmar central government, colluding deeply with local warlord Su Qi Du, establishing “state within a state” telecom fraud parks in Myawaddy. This model is highly autonomous, relying on armed forces to resist external attacks, but its scope is limited, and it risks falling into danger due to shifts in local power.

Differences in Profit Structures

Chen Zhi’s group adopts an “integrated self-operation + money laundering” model: directly conducting global telecom scams to defraud citizens’ funds, and using cryptocurrency mining to launder illicit money and earn mining profits. The profit margins are huge, with covert capital flows.

Yu Zhijiang’s group employs a “platform + subcontracting” industrialized model: not directly scamming, but acting as “landlord of telecom fraud industry,” leasing parks, providing shelter and services, and charging 248 groups. This model has stronger risk resistance through dispersed clients but is also a key target for law enforcement.

Differences in Protective Umbrellas and Downfall Paths

Chen Zhi’s protective umbrella is “state-level political-business collusion”—relying on the official recognition and corruption networks of the Cambodian central government. His downfall resulted from “transnational judicial cooperation”: the U.S. Department of Justice froze and seized his massive Bitcoin holdings; the Cambodian government cooperated under international pressure, leading to his arrest and extradition, exemplifying “China-U.S. judicial linkage.”

Yu Zhijiang’s umbrella is “local warlord protection”—relying on the armed forces of the Kachin Border Guard Army. His downfall stemmed from “regional judicial cooperation”: Chinese police issued a red notice via Interpol; Thai police arrested him in Bangkok; after over three years of legal battles, he was extradited back to China, demonstrating “China-Thailand judicial cooperation.”

The Common Code of the Two Empires: Underlying Logic of Cross-Border Crime

Despite many differences, Chen Zhi and Yu Zhijiang’s criminal empires follow the common underlying logic of cross-border crime.

First, both target Chinese people as the core group, with global expansion

Both are keenly aware of the psychological vulnerabilities within Chinese society, using “high-paying recruitment” and “high-yield investment” as bait for scams. Chen Zhi further expanded his scam network into the U.S., Europe, and other regions, achieving “globalized crime.”

Second, both have built “cross-border closed-loop industrial chains” to evade judicial crackdown

In personnel recruitment, they form “deception-transportation” chains through domestic and foreign intermediaries; in capital flow, Chen Zhi launders via cryptocurrencies, Yu Zhijiang colludes with underground banks; in site security, they rely on “lawless zones” abroad or official protection. Ultimately, forming a “domestic deception, overseas implementation, cross-border laundering” complete closed loop.

Third, both cause destructive harm to society

Chen Zhi’s scams threaten ordinary citizens’ property safety and disrupt global financial order; Yu Zhijiang’s parks become “hellish prisons,” involving human trafficking, torture, and severe human rights violations. Behind them are countless broken families and shattered lives.

Reflection on National Conditions: Why Myanmar and Cambodia Became Crime Hotbeds

The rise of Chen Zhi and Yu Zhijiang is not accidental but deeply rooted in the special national conditions of Myanmar and Cambodia. Their political systems, economic structures, and social governance shortcomings have provided fertile ground for these two black industry empires.

Myanmar’s Separatist Chaos

Myanmar’s status as a major cross-border telecom fraud hub stems from “long-term civil war leading to local separatism” and “economic backwardness fueling development anxiety.”

Politically, Myanmar has been embroiled in over 70 years of civil war since independence, with the central government unable to effectively control ethnic minority regions, forming a “weak central, strong local” separatist situation. The area where Myawaddy is located is a typical “local armed autonomous zone”—the Kachin ethnic alliance was the most resolute anti-government armed group; after splitting in 1994, the Kachin Buddhist Army (later rebranded as Kachin Border Guard Army) defected to the government but became the “local overlord” of Myawaddy.

For these local armed groups, military expenses and local governance require huge funds. Traditional drug trafficking and border trade profits are limited, while black industries like telecom fraud and gambling become “fast money shortcuts.” Su Qi Du’s willingness to shelter Yu Zhijiang is essentially an exchange of interests—Asia-Pacific New City brought huge tax revenue and “share dividends” to the Kachin Border Guard Army, which in turn provided land and security for the parks, forming a "warlord + black industry"利益共同体。

Economically, Myanmar is one of Southeast Asia’s least developed countries. After sanctions were lifted in 2015-2016, the government sought rapid economic development, planning infrastructure projects like the “Myawaddy Economic Corridor” to boost growth through border trade. This “hasty pursuit” mentality created opportunities for black industry infiltration.

Yu Zhijiang’s Asia-Pacific New City initially only received small-scale real estate permits but was packaged as a “$15 billion investment in a smart city,” even with high-level government facilitation—aiming to attract foreign investment to promote the economic corridor, but ignoring the illegal nature of the project. Eventually, Myawaddy shifted from an “economic corridor endpoint” to an “electric fraud endpoint.”

Furthermore, Myanmar’s weak judicial system and regions controlled by armed groups operate above the law, providing a “zero-risk” environment for telecom fraud. Poverty and low education levels supply abundant “human resources”—local residents, lured by high salaries, are deceived into parks as “pigs”; brutal management and violence prevent resistance, creating a vicious cycle of “recruitment-imprisonment-exploitation.”

Cambodia’s Centralized Rent-Seeking

Unlike Myanmar’s “chaotic separatism,” Cambodia’s relatively centralized political system, with strong government control but rampant corruption and over-reliance on foreign investment, forms the core soil for Chen Zhi’s criminal empire.

Politically, Cambodia’s authoritarian regime, while stabilizing, leads to excessive concentration of power and corruption. Under Hun Sen’s rule, to attract investment and promote economic growth, the government adopted a “lenient regulation” approach toward foreign capital, with potential “power-money transactions.”

Chen Zhi’s Prince Group rapidly rose by precisely exploiting this “rent-seeking logic”—large-scale investments in real estate, finance, and other sectors brought tax revenue and employment, gaining official recognition and honors; the government, through “awarding medals” and “streamlining approvals,” provided protection, forming a "political-business collusion"利益链。这种"红顶商人"模式使得陈志的犯罪活动得以隐藏在合法业务之下，甚至借助官方资源规避司法调查。

经济方面，柬埔寨高度依赖旅游、外资和房地产，抗风险能力较弱。2020年疫情爆发后，旅游业受重创，政府对招商引资的需求更为迫切，这为太子集团的扩张提供了契机。陈志的集团以"多元化经营"为幌子，在全国开发房地产、设立银行和赌场，不仅缓解了部分就业和税收压力，也成为"柬埔寨经济复苏的标杆企业"，巩固了其"合法地位"。

此外，柬埔寨金融监管体系不完善，对加密货币和跨境资金流转监管存在漏洞，为陈志的"加密货币洗钱"提供便利——LuBian矿池的比特币交易长期处于监管之外，直到被美国司法部追踪定位。

柬埔寨华人社区规模庞大，为陈志的犯罪活动提供了"便利的沟通渠道"——太子集团的核心成员多为华人，其诈骗网络也主要通过华人社群向全球扩散，增强了犯罪的隐蔽性。

全球治理的答案：因地制宜与协同作战

陈志和余智江两大电诈帝国的覆灭，标志着中国打击跨境电诈犯罪取得的重要胜利，但也提醒我们，跨境治理绝非一劳永逸。随着打击力度加大，犯罪集团可能转移到其他治理薄弱的国家和地区，甚至演变出更隐蔽的犯罪模式。

针对缅甸的"割据型黑产"

治理的核心是"强化区域司法合作+推动地方治理改善"。一方面，要深化与缅甸中央政府及地方武装的沟通协调，建立常态化的情报共享和联合执法机制。另一方面，要推动缅甸改善经济发展和社会治理，从根源上消除黑产滋生的土壤。

值得关注的是，自2025年以来，中缅双方就打击跨境犯罪深入交换意见，缅方表示将加强双多边合作，探讨建立常态化机制。此外，泰国、老挝采取切断边境电力供应、管控燃料出口等措施，有效打击了妙瓦底电诈园区，这种区域协同治理模式值得推广。

针对柬埔寨的"寻租型黑产"

治理的核心是"深化双边司法合作+推动腐败治理"。陈志被成功遣返回国，正是中柬司法合作的成果。未来需进一步扩大合作范围，覆盖资金追踪、资产没收等关键环节。

同时，要推动柬埔寨加强腐败治理，完善金融监管体系。国际社会应督促柬埔寨建立健全权力监督机制，打击政商勾结；帮助柬埔寨完善加密货币、跨境资金流转的监管规则，堵塞监管漏洞，让黑产资金无处遁形。

从全球层面看，构建多边协同网络

电诈犯罪的全球化特征，决定了单一国家无法独立完成打击任务。美国司法部对陈志的调查取证、资产没收，为跨国司法合作提供了范例——通过区块链追踪技术，实现了对跨境黑产资金的精准定位；通过国际通缉、资产冻结等手段，形成了对犯罪嫌疑人的全球围堵。

未来应推动建立"全球反电诈联盟"，整合各国执法资源，共享犯罪情报，统一司法标准，形成"打击-追逃-资产追缴"的全球闭环。同时，要加强对加密货币、虚拟资产的全球监管，推动各国建立统一的监管框架，消除监管套利空间，从根源上遏制黑产资金的跨境流转。

结语：正义的回归与永恒的警醒

陈志和余智江两大电诈帝国的崛起与覆灭，是东南亚跨境电诈犯罪的"缩影"，更是缅甸、柬埔寨两国特殊国情的"黑色注脚"。陈志的"红顶黑产"模式适应了柬埔寨集权寻租的政商环境；余智江的"军阀黑产"模式则扎根于缅甸割据动荡的社会土壤。两人的落网，彰显了中国"有案必查、有逃必追"的坚定决心，更体现了跨国司法合作的强大威力。

但警醒随之而来。跨境电诈犯罪的触角早已不止于东南亚——在非洲、中东、拉美等治理薄弱地区，新的"电诈帝国"可能正在萌芽。犯罪集团可能会演变出更隐蔽的模式，利用新技术规避打击。

这就要求我们既要精准把握不同国家的国情特质，采取"差异化"的治理策略；也要加强全球协同，构建"无死角"的治理网络。要让"国情适配"与"全球协同"成为打击跨境犯罪的双轮驱动力。

唯有如此，才能彻底根除跨境电诈的毒瘤，维护全球民众的财产安全与合法权益，让正义之光照耀每一个"法外之地"。