The US-Israel war against Iran escalates, and Gulf countries face difficult choices.

Caught between the war between the U.S. and Iran, America’s Gulf allies face a stark choice: to maintain a defensive posture or to join the fight against Iran.

Since the outbreak of war on February 28, Iran has launched thousands of drones and missiles at U.S. military and diplomatic facilities, damaging key energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. By blocking the global oil and gas supply artery of the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran has also deprived its Arab neighbors of crucial export revenues.

In the face of what they perceive as a survival threat, the largest economies and military powers in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are considering a shift to a more aggressive posture. Experts say this move could expose them to harsher retaliation from Iran.

Experts indicate that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are unlikely to directly join the war, but may expand logistical support for the U.S. and impose economic pressure on Iran.

Christopher Davidson, a scholar of Middle Eastern politics at Durham University in the UK, states: “In practice, ‘joining the war’ is likely to mean more opportunities for U.S. forces to access bases and airspace, harsher strikes against Iran’s commercial and financial networks in the Gulf region, and the implementation of strictly limited defensive military actions—rather than unrestricted bombing campaigns against Iran.”

Significant Shifts in Gulf Countries like Saudi Arabia

This shift appears to be underway. On March 23, reports emerged that Riyadh recently agreed to allow U.S. forces to use the King Fahd Airbase located near the Red Sea in southwestern Saudi Arabia.

This would mark a significant change. Like its Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia had previously committed that its airspace and military facilities would not be used to attack Iran.

Iran has accused Gulf states (many of which host U.S. military bases) of assisting American military operations. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on March 25 that there is “evidence that regional countries have provided services to the Americans.”

Riyadh ordered the expulsion of the Iranian military attaché and four embassy staff on March 21, citing ongoing Iranian attacks against Saudi territory.

Days earlier, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan stated to reporters that the country’s “patience regarding Iranian attacks is not unlimited.” He added, “Any notion that Gulf states are incapable of responding is a miscalculation.”

In the past three weeks, Iranian drones and missiles have targeted key refineries in Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter. Iran has also attacked the U.S. embassy in Riyadh.

Meanwhile, in recent weeks, the UAE has cracked down on institutions linked to Iran, shutting down a hospital, a social club, and several schools.

Last week, the UAE closed an Iranian hospital located in Dubai—a government-affiliated medical facility. Operated by the Iranian Red Crescent, the hospital employs about 700 people and is one of the oldest medical institutions in the country.

In the UAE’s sternest criticism, Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan tweeted on March 22 that the country would not be “extorted by terrorists,” seemingly referring to Iran.

His comments were a response to former French ambassador to the U.S. Gérard Araud, who criticized remarks made by Anwar Gargash, a presidential advisor in the UAE. Gargash stated that Abu Dhabi’s focus should not be on achieving a ceasefire with Tehran but on containing Iran’s “nuclear threats, missiles, drones, and intimidation of maritime routes.”

Iranian drones and missiles have also caused significant damage in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, damaging oil and gas facilities and causing power outages. The U.S. and Israel have also attacked Iran’s civilian infrastructure, including oil depots and desalination plants.

Vulnerable to Retaliation

Experts say that despite the escalation in rhetoric, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are unlikely to risk direct military confrontation with Iran.

Simon Henderson, director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, states: “The infrastructure of these two countries—power plants, desalination facilities, and residential buildings—is highly vulnerable to Iranian attacks.”

“Both countries also have Shia Muslim communities with close ties to Iran,” he adds. “Becoming more involved in the war would only worsen their predicament.”

Experts suggest that if Iran survives the U.S.-Israel war, Gulf nations will face a more bold and radical Iran. However, if its regime collapses, it could trigger chaos that spreads throughout the region.

For Gulf states, the best-case scenario is not regime change, but rather “providing mostly indirect, carefully calibrated support to the U.S. to restore deterrence against Iran, deepen security ties with Washington, and limit Iran’s influence without triggering a major escalation in Gulf oil,” Davidson says.

He adds, “The worst outcome would be deeper involvement by Saudi Arabia or the UAE, particularly in an offensive capacity, which would fuel the attack cycle by Iran and its proxies, damage energy infrastructure, disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, scare away investments, and drag them into a protracted, costly regional war.”