Lost 46.6 billion, then invested another 20 billion, Liu Qiangdong has a new "money-burning" direction

This article is originally published by Wumiancaijing.
Author: Haitang Ye
Editor: Chen Jian
Design: Lansheng

“Projected total investment in the food delivery business will decrease compared to 2025 by 2026.”

On March 5th, during JD.com’s earnings call after releasing its 2025 financial report, CEO Xu Ran’s statement sparked numerous speculations.

466 billion — this is the loss reported by the new business segment including food delivery, nearly wiping out JD Retail’s entire annual operating profit and halving the group’s net profit to 19.6 billion yuan.

Spending 466 billion yuan to gain a 15% share of the food delivery market. And then?

Xu Ran’s statement seems to suggest: the fight in food delivery is no longer sustainable.

If you think that way, you might be underestimating Liu Qiangdong.

The 466 billion yuan loss didn’t stop him from “burning money”; he simply shifted direction.

On February 26th, just a week before the earnings release, JD quietly launched the “Billion Supermarket” channel, announcing an investment of over 20 billion yuan in subsidies over the next three years, still aiming to dominate the instant retail market.

After losing 46.6 billion yuan in food delivery, Liu Qiangdong is turning around and pouring another 20 billion yuan.

Between losses and investments, Liu Qiangdong made it clear: JD can choose not to fight to the death in food delivery but will never admit defeat in instant retail.

The market seems to have understood. The day after the earnings report, JD’s stock price surged nearly 10%.

A year of new business losses totaling 46.6 billion yuan

Food delivery has become JD’s most “money-burning” battlefield.

According to Xu Ran, in 2025, JD’s food delivery was just getting started, with significant investments in operations, R&D, and other areas.

Therefore, in 2025, JD’s marketing expenses soared from 48 billion yuan in 2024 to 84 billion yuan, a 75.1% increase, accounting for 6.4% of revenue, up from 4.1%. JD openly stated that these expenses were mainly for promoting new business.

Additionally, JD’s R&D expenses in 2025 increased by 30.5% to 22.2 billion yuan, representing 1.7% of revenue, up from 1.5%. Fulfillment costs also rose by 25.2% to 88.2 billion yuan, accounting for 6.7% of revenue, up from 6.1%.

With R&D, marketing, and fulfillment costs rising simultaneously, total annual investment approached 194.4 billion yuan, yet the returns were staggering:

The financial report shows that the revenue from the new business segment, including food delivery, was 49.3 billion yuan for the year, while operating losses expanded to 46.6 billion yuan. This loss increased over 15 times compared to 2024, nearly “eating up” JD’s core profit source — the retail segment’s annual operating profit of 51.4 billion yuan.

▲ JD’s new business losses are expanding. Image from Dingjia One.

The operating loss rate reached an even more direct 94.6%.

Simply put, for every 100 yuan earned, JD loses 94.6 yuan. In the fourth quarter alone, the loss was 14.8 billion yuan, compared to just 900 million yuan in the same period of 2024.

In fact, starting from Q2 2025, the new business already showed signs of “burning money,” with quarterly losses reaching 14.78 billion yuan. In comparison, the same quarter in 2024 saw only 695 million yuan in operating losses.

The frantic investments also significantly eroded the group’s cash flow. JD’s free cash flow for the year plummeted from 43.7 billion yuan in 2024 to just 6.5 billion yuan, a decline of over 85%.

What has short-term profit sacrifice bought?

According to JD, it has resulted in user base and market share growth: 240 million orders placed by users, and a 15% share of the food delivery market. Their plan is to increase this to 30% by 2026.

However, JD’s figures differ from third-party statistics.

According to “Late Post” in February, the food delivery market has stabilized, with Meituan and Taobao Flash Sale holding over 50% and 40% market share respectively, while JD’s share is less than 5%.

Hong Kong Economic Daily reports that, in Morgan Stanley’s latest report, based on order volume, Meituan handles 71 million orders daily, accounting for 50% of the market; Alibaba follows with 42%, and JD accounts for 8%.

Differences in data sources reflect varying perspectives on the food delivery battle. Goldman Sachs predicts that the market share among food delivery and instant e-commerce will form a 5:4:1 ratio among Meituan, Alibaba, and JD.

For JD’s nascent food delivery segment, these figures are both a sign of presence and a harsh mathematical challenge:

To climb from that “1” to higher positions, it must pay a cost greater than the current 46.6 billion yuan loss. This money-burning war has only just begun.

“100 Billion Supermarket” plans to invest 20 billion yuan over three years

The 46.6 billion yuan loss didn’t stop Liu Qiangdong from “burning money.”

But this time, the money is directed elsewhere.

Liu Qiangdong perhaps realizes: to win in the instant retail battle, you can’t just fight on the opponent’s turf; you must also focus on your own turf.

On February 26th, JD quietly launched a new channel called “Billion Supermarket.”

Unlike previous low-profile launches, JD announced that over the next three years, it will invest more than 20 billion yuan in product subsidies, aiming for an additional 200 billion yuan in sales.

This is the first time in nearly two years that JD has released such a large subsidy for the supermarket and department store category.

More notably, JD explicitly stated that the subsidy effort in the supermarket category will surpass its traditional advantage in electronics, becoming the largest investment in the group’s billion-yuan subsidy system.

This adjustment is both defensive and offensive, with a single goal — to seize the voice in instant retail.

Just a month ago, Meituan spent $717 million (about 4.9 billion RMB) to fully acquire Dingdong Maicai’s China operations.

Behind this deal lies an awkward episode for JD.

Sources close to JD revealed that as early as early January 2026, JD had reached a preliminary acquisition agreement with Dingdong Maicai, with a price range of 5-6 billion yuan, just a step away from closing the deal. But ultimately, Meituan outbid with a higher offer and successfully snatched it.

Market analysts commented to “Business Observer”: “JD’s bid was low, and their decision-making was slow.”

Losing Dingdong Maicai came at a heavy cost for JD. Dingdong has over 1,000 front warehouses and 7 million monthly active users, dominating the Yangtze River Delta region. Meanwhile, Meituan’s own Xiaoxiang Supermarket had nearly 30 billion yuan GMV in 2024, with close to 1,000 front warehouses, and about 50% of orders concentrated in Beijing and Shenzhen. After acquiring Dingdong, Meituan filled its shortcoming in the Yangtze River Delta, bringing the three major cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen into its fold.

“Meituan spent 4.9 billion to buy a defensive insurance, pushing JD off the table,” some market comments suggest. JD’s response was swift — launching “Billion Supermarket” a month later.

Moreover, the competition in the supermarket track is fierce beyond Meituan.

In January this year, Pinduoduo quietly tested its “Billion Supermarket” channel. From the pages shared by beta users, it covers high-frequency essentials like fruits, vegetables, and household daily chemicals. As the pioneer of the “Billion Subsidy” strategy, Pinduoduo successfully entered the online 3C digital market, grabbing market share from JD and Tmall.

Major internet giants are all turning their guns toward the supermarket track.

E-commerce analyst Li Chengdong pointed out the deeper logic behind JD’s adjustments. In his view, although last year’s explosive food delivery war profoundly impacted the instant retail landscape, strategically, “rather than burning money in the food delivery track, it’s more efficient to allocate resources directly to the core instant retail business.”

▲ Instant retail has become a battleground. Image from the Ministry of Commerce Research Institute.

From billions spent on food delivery to hundreds of billions poured into supermarkets, JD’s path is changing, but the ultimate goal remains — to dominate the voice in the era of everything-to-your-home.

The battle in instant retail is tough on both sides

But this battle is truly difficult.

The food delivery battlefield is hard to fight.

According to “Late Post,” Alibaba’s core management team clearly stated in an early 2026 internal meeting that they will continue to increase strategic investments in Taobao Flash Sale, encouraging teams to push boldly, “without bearing losses for the next three years.” Alibaba founder Jack Ma even defined Taobao Flash Sale internally as “a milestone battle for the group.”

What does this mean?

It means that in the food delivery arena, JD is facing an opponent that won’t retreat just because of losses. In 2026, Taobao Flash Sale’s investment will surpass last year’s, with a clear goal: to develop high-value orders over 30 yuan, and to focus on breaking through specific categories in instant retail. Meanwhile, Meituan, having spent 4.9 billion to acquire Dingdong, has filled its gaps in the Yangtze River Delta.

JD’s 46.6 billion yuan spent for a 15% share in food delivery must continue to grow amid the fierce competition with Meituan (over 50%) and Alibaba (over 40%). There is no retreat in this battlefield.

The supermarket battle is equally challenging.

Hema’s discount format “Super Hema” is rapidly expanding, opening 7 new stores in just two months; Meituan’s community discount brand “Happy Monkey Supermarket” entered South China earlier this year, and has since opened stores in Changping, Fangshan, and Miyun in Beijing, with plans for three more in Ningbo.

Notably, both are already competing head-to-head. In Mentougou, Beijing, Meituan’s Happy Monkey Supermarket and JD’s Discount Supermarket are only five minutes apart by car. In the same community, targeting price-sensitive customers, both stores are directly competing.

Traditional players are also fighting back. Yonghui Supermarket is undergoing a “self-revolution” transformation, closing nearly 400 stores and restructuring over 300 existing ones in a “Pang Donglai style.” Wumart’s Pang Donglai stores have been restructured into 43 outlets.

What is more daunting than competitors is the nature of the supermarket business itself.

Consumers demand both cost-effectiveness and quality, along with freshness — industry insiders say achieving “more, faster, better, cheaper” in the non-standard, low-margin, high-loss supermarket category is akin to an “impossible quadrilateral.”

The 20 billion yuan subsidy is just the beginning.

In the instant retail track, no one can easily pass the test. For JD, just starting out, this tough battle is only halfway through.