The Super App Race in the AI Era: Will ByteDance and Alibaba Emerge as Winners?

The competition for dominance in China’s AI-native Super Apps represents one of the most consequential business battles of the decade. Unlike the mobile internet era, which saw as many as 10 apps achieve over 500 million monthly active users (MAU), the artificial intelligence epoch will likely consolidate around just 3 to 4 Super Apps commanding such scale. This fundamental shift reflects how AI fundamentally restructures digital platforms—increasing their value density while reducing the number of viable competitors. As we move through 2026, the strategic moves made by China’s tech giants in 2024-2025 now reveal their true intentions in this transformative race.

Understanding the Super App Shift: From Many Competitors to Few Winners

The transition from mobile internet to AI era represents a qualitative change in platform dynamics. During the smartphone boom, approximately 15 applications in China maintained over 100 million daily active users (DAU), with roughly 10 exceeding 500 million MAU. The revenue opportunity was distributed, but not concentrated. Today’s emerging Super Apps in the AI era will consolidate user attention dramatically differently. An app achieving 500 million MAU in the AI era (roughly translating to 350 million DAU) will capture value worth several multiples of what similar scale represented in the mobile era.

The fundamental reason: AI-native Super Apps function as gateways—controlling the entry point through which users access services, information, and commerce. This position guarantees extraordinary commercial returns. Users gravitate toward the platform that solves the most problems with the greatest efficiency. A Super App that reaches AGI-level capabilities in its large language model can influence every downstream decision a user makes—from which products to purchase to which services to engage with.

ByteDance’s Unstoppable Momentum: From Doubao to Robotics

ByteDance’s strategic vision has crystallized into unmistakable ambition. The Doubao AI assistant represents merely the entry point. The company’s subsequent moves—cooperation with Seres for automotive manufacturing, reported exploration of space computing infrastructure, and international expansion—reveal a calculated ecosystem play. Each move is a tile in a grand mosaic: Doubao enters phones, then cars, then robotics. Through this progression, the AI system becomes the decision-making intermediary for users across multiple domains.

Zhang Yiming’s track record suggests these moves will be executed with extraordinary effectiveness. ByteDance’s 2024 AI strategy—after receiving only a 60-point evaluation at the 2023 year-end assessment—improved dramatically to merit a 120-point rating by year-end 2025, with expectations for even higher marks in 2026. This reflects not just technological advancement but strategic foresight and operational discipline.

The TikTok situation, while legally resolved in the international sphere, has paradoxically freed ByteDance to accelerate overseas expansion. Doubao’s international rollout, combined with ByteDance’s proven ability to scale products globally, positions the company for market expansion beyond China.

Alibaba’s Jack Ma: The Strategist’s Comeback

Jack Ma’s recent strategic positioning deserves particular recognition. With Qwen serving as its left hand, Afu (the medical AI platform built on the Haodf.com acquisition) as its right hand, and Alibaba Cloud infrastructure at its core, the strategic layout reveals sophisticated long-term thinking.

The Haodf.com acquisition approximately 18 months ago—valued at roughly 2 billion yuan—represents precisely the kind of asymmetric strategic move that characterizes Ma’s thinking. At the time of acquisition, both Baidu and Tencent held shareholder positions and held right-of-first refusal. Alibaba moved decisively to secure the asset. Today, observers widely estimate Haodf.com’s value at 10 billion yuan minimum. This foundation enables Afu to provide genuine, differentiated capabilities that purely conversational AI cannot match.

Qwen is distinctly not a generic chatbot. It is positioned as “the world’s first app that gets things done”—capable of actual service delivery, transaction completion, and problem-solving. The crucial differentiator: local services integration and instant retail capabilities provide the foundational substrate for this execution. Alibaba’s tactical engagement with Meituan’s market space serves multiple purposes, but strategically the primary goal is clear—delay Meituan’s progress in launching an AI-native Super App competitor before Alibaba itself consolidates the market.

This represents the first genuine competitive showdown between two entrepreneurial titans now operating behind the scenes: Jack Ma and Zhang Yiming.

The Battle Intensifies: Who Else Can Compete?

Beyond ByteDance and Alibaba, six other major technology companies harbor ambitions in the Super App arena: Tencent, Meituan, Pinduoduo, JD.com, Baidu, and others. However, the economics of this competition are brutal. Only companies possessing over 20 billion dollars in readily deployable capital and demonstrated willingness to commit entirely to this effort can realistically participate.

For Meituan and Pinduoduo specifically, the stakes are extraordinarily high. Whichever platform launches an AI-native Super App competitor first will likely experience stock price rebounds exceeding 20 percent from current valuation levels. The mathematics are striking: companies that achieve this breakthrough position themselves as dominant platforms, while delayed competitors face diminishing returns.

Meituan’s exit from community group buying was not merely a cost-cutting measure—it represented a strategic pivot enabling the company’s full focus on AI-era competition. Similarly, Pinduoduo must now make an existential choice: pursue simultaneous expansion in international e-commerce and food delivery while competing for Super App status, or prioritize the highest-leverage opportunity. The dilemma is real and demands resolution by Q1 2026 or risk permanent disadvantage.

Tencent’s WeChat: Defending Against Disruption

Tencent occupies perhaps the most complex position. WeChat remains China’s most embedded communications network—a textbook-perfect platform with exceptional product execution. The company’s Mini Programs and Video Channels demonstrate architectural sophistication.

Yet Tencent faces a fundamental question: as Doubao’s DAU surpasses WeChat’s historical engagement metrics—as occurred when Douyin eclipsed WeChat in user time allocation—will WeChat retain its status as the dominant platform? If that transition occurs, will communications network effects prove sufficient to maintain primacy, or will Doubao’s AI capabilities and ecosystem breadth prove more valuable?

Young users born after 1995 demonstrate markedly higher engagement with Doubao than with WeChat for many decision-making tasks. The transition appears not hypothetical but inevitable. When it materializes, the competitive pressure on WeChat will dwarf the historical impact of Douyin competition.

Huawei’s Strategic Focus: Building China’s Auto Alliance, Not AI Super Apps

Huawei will definitively not enter the AI Super App market—and if it attempted entry, competitive disadvantages are structural. Huawei’s positioning as China’s integrated semiconductor, inference, autonomous driving, and manufacturing platform is strategically sound and distinct. The Huawei Auto Alliance, incorporating partnerships from Seres through Chery to increasingly larger automotive manufacturers like BAIC, SAIC, and state-owned enterprises, will consolidate into China’s largest automotive group alliance. This represents superior strategic positioning to Super App competition and plays to Huawei’s genuine competitive advantages.

The Trillion-Yuan Prize

The consolidation around 3-4 dominant Super Apps will generate future revenue streams approaching 1 trillion yuan. The competitive intensity reflects this enormous prize. Companies now facing internal decisions must commit irrevocably by early 2026 or forfeit realistic participation.

For Zhou Yahui and other strategists observing these movements, the implications are clear: the AI era’s architecture will differ fundamentally from the mobile internet era. Fewer giants will capture disproportionate value. The companies executing with strategic clarity, technical sophistication, and operational discipline in 2026 will dominate Chinese digital commerce for decades to come.

The battle that began in 2024-2025 will likely conclude with clear winners and permanent losers within the next 24 months. The time for decisive action is no longer approaching—it is now.