When China’s export figures hit a record $1.2 trillion surplus in 2025, the headline seemed triumphant. Yet behind the numbers lies a starkly different reality for the sales professionals driving this expansion. Reuters interviews with 14 export salespeople reveal that while China diversified into new geographic markets—from Africa to Latin America to Southeast Asia—the ground-level experience was fundamentally grueling. For many, including Aimee Chen, an export saleswoman with roughly two decades of experience, 2025 wasn’t a year of success but rather the toughest of her entire career.
The paradox is stark: China achieved record export volumes by pivoting away from U.S. markets, yet those doing the selling experienced unprecedented strain. Chen’s pet products company, like many others, was forced to scramble for new buyers after U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff hikes—exceeding 100% in April before a partial reversal—caused orders from American clients to plunge by roughly one-third. This wasn’t just a temporary setback; it triggered a desperate hunt for alternative markets that would ultimately reshape how Chinese exporters operate.
The Geographical Pivot: Chasing Smaller Orders Across Emerging Markets
China’s official response to tariff pressure was swift and massive. Chinese shipments to Africa surged 25.8%, to Latin America rose 7.4%, to Southeast Asia jumped 13.4%, and to the European Union increased 8.4%, all while U.S.-bound shipments contracted 20%. The expansion appeared economically successful on paper, helping China maintain its position as a global export powerhouse despite new trade barriers.
But this geographic diversification came with a hidden cost structure. Multiple salespeople, including Monica Chen, who has sold auto parts from Zhejiang province for over a decade, reported that orders from these emerging markets were substantially smaller in volume and far less lucrative than their previous U.S. dealings. Where American retailers had been “easy-going” and signed deals quickly, customers in new markets demanded constant haggling over price. The result: dramatically reduced commissions and pay for sales staff who were already working at the edge of their capacity.
Government data underscored the squeeze: profits at China’s industrial firms fell 13.1% year-on-year in November 2025—the fastest decline in over a year. The erosion of corporate profits directly translated into pressure on individual salespeople to shoulder more of the workload for less return.
The Work Intensity Trap: Earning 717 Yuan While the Clock Never Stops
The compensation structure illustrates the brutal reality. Cici Lv, a 24-year-old electric bicycle battery salesperson working from Shenzhen since 2022, earns approximately 5,000 yuan ($717) per month—barely above factory worker wages, yet her responsibilities extend far beyond traditional office hours. Unlike factory workers whose shifts end at fixed times, Lv described herself as being perpetually “on the clock,” constantly messaging international clients across different time zones.
The low compensation barely compensated for the emotional and temporal demands. One client engaged Lv in months of messaging about everything from world news to lunch preferences to religious beliefs, ultimately ordering just a single battery—earning her a commission of less than $2. These micro-transactions, repeated across dozens of interactions, created an illusion of activity without corresponding financial benefit.
A social media analysis proved telling: among the top 100 most-liked export-related posts on RedNote platform during the six months ending mid-January 2026, 37 raised complaints about heightened job stress. Six additional posts documented unprofessional client interactions. Rowan Wang, a sales representative for an agricultural equipment exporter in eastern China, crystallized the expectation: “If we’re alive, we have to reply.” Several salespeople reported fielding unsolicited relationship proposals and described the psychological toll this took—as Lv noted, “Sometimes it messes with your mind.”
Saturated Markets and the Race to the Bottom
As new markets became target destinations for Chinese exporters competing against one another, a familiar dynamic emerged: aggressive price-cutting. Monica Chen’s firm ultimately responded to market saturation by slashing prices to undercut rival Chinese companies also hunting for foreign buyers. The strategy backfired on individual commission structures; orders fell one-third in value compared to 2024. “It’s very hard to develop new markets, they are basically saturated,” she observed.
This race-to-the-bottom dynamic wasn’t unique to auto parts. Companies across sectors increased business travel intensity—Monica ramped up travel to three times monthly, supplemented by constant cold-calling—all to maintain declining profit margins. The compounding pressure on salespeople reflected a deeper structural problem: as companies chased volume over margin, individual workers bore the cost of that shift through intensified labor, longer hours, and psychological strain.
The Sustainability Question: Can This Model Endure?
Mingwei Liu, director of the Center for Global Work and Employment at Rutgers University, articulated the underlying economic logic: China’s export strategy in alternative markets depends on firms chasing high volumes of cheap orders. Success typically requires extending longer payment cycles to customers and bearing substantially higher default risks. “This market reorientation increases the labour intensity, the emotional burden and income uncertainty faced by workers in export sales,” Liu explained.
The hardship reported by frontline salespeople may signal an early warning about the fragility of China’s 2025 export success, according to Chen Bo, a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute. Economists have long emphasized that China must develop domestic consumption to escape its deflationary cycle. Yet weak internal demand pushes producers outward, forcing them to compete against each other in foreign markets. This generates revenue but erodes profit margins—precisely the squeeze visible in the stories of salespeople like Chen, Lv, and Monica.
The fundamental challenge remains unresolved: China “can’t maintain sustainable economic growth by relying on foreign markets,” Chen Bo argued. The record 2025 export figures masked a fragile reality—profits falling, workers struggling under intensified demands, and markets growing ever more crowded. Whether this export-dependent model can sustain into 2026 and beyond depends largely on whether Beijing addresses the domestic consumption gap. Until then, frontline salespeople like those earning 717 yuan monthly will continue shouldering the burden of an economic strategy built on volume rather than value.
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The Hidden Cost Behind China's Record Export Boom: Why 717 Isn't Enough for Frontline Salespeople
When China’s export figures hit a record $1.2 trillion surplus in 2025, the headline seemed triumphant. Yet behind the numbers lies a starkly different reality for the sales professionals driving this expansion. Reuters interviews with 14 export salespeople reveal that while China diversified into new geographic markets—from Africa to Latin America to Southeast Asia—the ground-level experience was fundamentally grueling. For many, including Aimee Chen, an export saleswoman with roughly two decades of experience, 2025 wasn’t a year of success but rather the toughest of her entire career.
The paradox is stark: China achieved record export volumes by pivoting away from U.S. markets, yet those doing the selling experienced unprecedented strain. Chen’s pet products company, like many others, was forced to scramble for new buyers after U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff hikes—exceeding 100% in April before a partial reversal—caused orders from American clients to plunge by roughly one-third. This wasn’t just a temporary setback; it triggered a desperate hunt for alternative markets that would ultimately reshape how Chinese exporters operate.
The Geographical Pivot: Chasing Smaller Orders Across Emerging Markets
China’s official response to tariff pressure was swift and massive. Chinese shipments to Africa surged 25.8%, to Latin America rose 7.4%, to Southeast Asia jumped 13.4%, and to the European Union increased 8.4%, all while U.S.-bound shipments contracted 20%. The expansion appeared economically successful on paper, helping China maintain its position as a global export powerhouse despite new trade barriers.
But this geographic diversification came with a hidden cost structure. Multiple salespeople, including Monica Chen, who has sold auto parts from Zhejiang province for over a decade, reported that orders from these emerging markets were substantially smaller in volume and far less lucrative than their previous U.S. dealings. Where American retailers had been “easy-going” and signed deals quickly, customers in new markets demanded constant haggling over price. The result: dramatically reduced commissions and pay for sales staff who were already working at the edge of their capacity.
Government data underscored the squeeze: profits at China’s industrial firms fell 13.1% year-on-year in November 2025—the fastest decline in over a year. The erosion of corporate profits directly translated into pressure on individual salespeople to shoulder more of the workload for less return.
The Work Intensity Trap: Earning 717 Yuan While the Clock Never Stops
The compensation structure illustrates the brutal reality. Cici Lv, a 24-year-old electric bicycle battery salesperson working from Shenzhen since 2022, earns approximately 5,000 yuan ($717) per month—barely above factory worker wages, yet her responsibilities extend far beyond traditional office hours. Unlike factory workers whose shifts end at fixed times, Lv described herself as being perpetually “on the clock,” constantly messaging international clients across different time zones.
The low compensation barely compensated for the emotional and temporal demands. One client engaged Lv in months of messaging about everything from world news to lunch preferences to religious beliefs, ultimately ordering just a single battery—earning her a commission of less than $2. These micro-transactions, repeated across dozens of interactions, created an illusion of activity without corresponding financial benefit.
A social media analysis proved telling: among the top 100 most-liked export-related posts on RedNote platform during the six months ending mid-January 2026, 37 raised complaints about heightened job stress. Six additional posts documented unprofessional client interactions. Rowan Wang, a sales representative for an agricultural equipment exporter in eastern China, crystallized the expectation: “If we’re alive, we have to reply.” Several salespeople reported fielding unsolicited relationship proposals and described the psychological toll this took—as Lv noted, “Sometimes it messes with your mind.”
Saturated Markets and the Race to the Bottom
As new markets became target destinations for Chinese exporters competing against one another, a familiar dynamic emerged: aggressive price-cutting. Monica Chen’s firm ultimately responded to market saturation by slashing prices to undercut rival Chinese companies also hunting for foreign buyers. The strategy backfired on individual commission structures; orders fell one-third in value compared to 2024. “It’s very hard to develop new markets, they are basically saturated,” she observed.
This race-to-the-bottom dynamic wasn’t unique to auto parts. Companies across sectors increased business travel intensity—Monica ramped up travel to three times monthly, supplemented by constant cold-calling—all to maintain declining profit margins. The compounding pressure on salespeople reflected a deeper structural problem: as companies chased volume over margin, individual workers bore the cost of that shift through intensified labor, longer hours, and psychological strain.
The Sustainability Question: Can This Model Endure?
Mingwei Liu, director of the Center for Global Work and Employment at Rutgers University, articulated the underlying economic logic: China’s export strategy in alternative markets depends on firms chasing high volumes of cheap orders. Success typically requires extending longer payment cycles to customers and bearing substantially higher default risks. “This market reorientation increases the labour intensity, the emotional burden and income uncertainty faced by workers in export sales,” Liu explained.
The hardship reported by frontline salespeople may signal an early warning about the fragility of China’s 2025 export success, according to Chen Bo, a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute. Economists have long emphasized that China must develop domestic consumption to escape its deflationary cycle. Yet weak internal demand pushes producers outward, forcing them to compete against each other in foreign markets. This generates revenue but erodes profit margins—precisely the squeeze visible in the stories of salespeople like Chen, Lv, and Monica.
The fundamental challenge remains unresolved: China “can’t maintain sustainable economic growth by relying on foreign markets,” Chen Bo argued. The record 2025 export figures masked a fragile reality—profits falling, workers struggling under intensified demands, and markets growing ever more crowded. Whether this export-dependent model can sustain into 2026 and beyond depends largely on whether Beijing addresses the domestic consumption gap. Until then, frontline salespeople like those earning 717 yuan monthly will continue shouldering the burden of an economic strategy built on volume rather than value.